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CLAIM AGAINST LINER CONFERENCES FOR DAMAGES FOR
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Yeheskel Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd & others
[2003] EWHC 687 English Commercial Court
Facts
The claimant, X, brought a claim for damages against the defendants for breach of Article 82 EC. X
was managing director of a liner company (`BCL') which operated routes between the United
Kingdom and Israel and northern Europe (the relevant market) in 1988. The defendants were
members of two liner conferences which also operated those routes. BCL relied on the bottom end
of themarketbut, as allegedby BCL, the conferences saweven that as a threat and swiftly took anti-
competitive measures against BCL. The measures were potentially contrary to Article 81which
prohibits all agreements or concerted practices which may affect trade between member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the commonmarket.The defendants, however, argued that those practices were legitimised
by Regulation 4056/86, the block exemption applicable to concerted practices by liner conferences.
Considering the difficulty in proving that the block exemption did not apply, the claimant's principal
claimwas based on Article 82.That Article provides that a`ny abuse by one ormore undertakings of a
dominant positionwithin the commonmarket or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited'. X con-
tended that the conferences had abused their dominance by:
(a) their rate-setting policy in the course of a ratewar which involved predatory pricing;
(b) their use of f`ighting ships' which involved the conferences setting reduced rates for individual
ships that were to sail on similar dates and routes to BCL's ships; and
(c) spreading rumours that BCL was insolvent or would have to leave the relevantmarket.
Decision
The Commercial Court held that the two conferences were sufficiently connected, and their
decision-taking as to price levels was sufficiently connected, for them to be treated as a collective
entity for the purposes of determining whether they were guilty of abusing a dominant position.
Although there had been some market share diminution following the entry into the market by a
new shipping line (MSC, a third party), the position held by the conferences (of between 50 and 60
per cent) was substantial enough to be characterised as dominant.
As far as the question of abusewas concerned,Colman J held that a distinctionmustbemadebetween
the alleged abusive conduct and thepurpose for which such conductwas pursued.The court held that
the law as laid down in Case 85/76Hoffmann-La Rochev Commission [1979] ECR 461andCaseT-65/89
BPB Industries and British Gypsumv Commission [1993] 5 CMLR 32 required the assessment to bemade
in two stages; stage one entailed an objective inquiry as towhether themeasures takenwere abnor-
mal conduct of a dominant party, while stage two required the court to assess subjectively, despite
the finding that the conduct was not abnormal, whether the intention of themeasurewas to hinder
or eliminate competition.The court found in the present case that therewas no eliminatory intent.
As for Article 81, the court held that the block exemption applied because the defendants did in fact
charge u`niform and common freightrates' (as requiredbyArticle1(3)(b),Regulation 4056/86 for the
defendants to qualify as liner conferences for the purposes of the block exemption).
Comment
This case is important; for the first time, a claim for damages has been brought in an English court
founded on Article 82 EC and, significantly for maritime lawyers, for the first time, a complaint in
competition law before an English court against liner conferences. The transcript runs into about
130 pages and it is impossible to do justice to the full judgment in this short note, which will thus
highlight only a few interesting aspects of the case.
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Article 81and the block exemption
An issue of some significance to maritime lawyers is the court's application of the definition of l`iner
conferences' as set out in Article1(3)(b), Regulation 4056/86. Article1(3)(b) provides that:
l`iner conference'means a group of two ormore vessel-operating carriers which provides international
liner services for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes within specified geographical
limits andwhichhas an agreementor arrangement,whatever its nature,within the frameworkofwhich
they operate under uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to
the provision of liner services.
Key to this definition is the charging of `uniform or common freight rates and other agreed
conditions'. It was clear from the fact that there was no obvious uniform or common charge per se
in that therewas no uniform tariff list but the court considered that the question of uniformitymust
be evaluated contextually.
The typical circumstances of the relevant market in question were that when a shipper approaches
his agent for a shippingrate for a particular commodity, the agentwould ascertain therate charged to
that shipper by BCL andwould then approach his liner company and ask for authority to charge that
customer for that commodity a rate lower than the conference's emergency tariff.The liner company
might then make a special rate application to the Special Lines Committee. If the Committee
approved the special rate, the liner company would then authorise its agent to quote the reduced
rate to the shipper in question.The rate was likely to be slightly higher than the competitor's rate
andwouldusuallybe applicable to future shipments on the same route of that same commodity, with
aminimumquantity qualification.Notice of the special rate commitmentwould thenbe circulated to
all the conferencemembers and that rate would be applicable to all shipments of precisely the same
commodity on that route and subject to the sameminimum quantity requirement.The list of special
rateswouldnot, however, bepublished to shippers in the sameway as a tariff. Itwouldbekept secret
from them in case shippers of similar butnot identical commodities attempted to negotiate down the
rates for their cargoes.However, the result was that:
all shippers of the precisely same commodity on the exactly same route in the same quantity would be
charged the same rate except that theremight occasionally be a casewhere a liner company charged a
particular shipper of a particular commodity a rate designed to preserve or regain the customer from a
competitor which was not charged to other shippers of the same commodity, either because that
commodity was unique to the shipper or because the rate had not been approved by the Conference.
Accordingly, although the special rateswerenotpublished to shippers in the sameway as a tariff, they
would very soon come to know of them due to the transparent market of the Israeli shipping
industry.The effect of this regime was therefore not that there would be multiple conference rates
for the same service but that there would be a single (inadequately published) rate for the same
service. Hence, the defendants must be said to be liner conferences protected by the block
exemption.
This approach taken by the courtmay not work in the favour of the complainant in the present case
but it clearly coincides with the teleological approach of EU jurisprudence (CaseT-395/94 Atlantic
Container Line & others v Commission [2002] ECR II-875 (better known as theTAA (Trans Atlantic
Agreement) case), judgment of the Court of First Instance, 28 February 2002). Additionally, if and
when the block exemption is removed in the future, it seems to follow that the notion of l`iner con-
ference' as applied by the court in this case would be particularly useful. A narrow definition would
offer only limitedprotection (should theblockexemptionberemoved) to a potential liner competitor.
Another issue of some importance is the clarification of the burden of proof. The court held that
although it is for the liner conferences to prove that they are liner conferences for the purposes of
theRegulation, it is for the claimant to show that the conferences didnot satisfy the condition for the
exemptionunder Article 4. Article 4 provides that theblockexemption only applies if the agreement
or concerted practice in question does not cause detriment to certain ports, transport users or
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carriers by applying for the carriage of the same goods and in the relevant market, rates and
conditions of carriagewhich differ according to the countryof origin or destination or portof loading
or discharge, unless such rates or conditions can be economically justified.
Article 82
The first issue in relation to Article 82 is that as there were two separate defendants, the claimant
had to show that there was in fact joint dominance. It is noteworthy that in general the court (or
Commission) will not allow the complainantmerely to r`ecycle' the facts which point to an infringe-
mentofArticle 81 (concertedpractice) for thepurposes of Article 82 (CaseT-68, 77-78/89 Re Italian
Fiat Glass [1992] ECR I-1403) but an agreement or concertedpracticemay result in the parties being
so linked as to their conducton aparticularmarket that theypresent themselves as a collective entity
vis-a© -vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers (see Case C-395-396/96P
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transportes SA & others v Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, commonly
referred to as the CMB case).What is important to note, though, is that it is not enough to rely on
evidence relating to Article 81as a presumptive assertion of joint dominance.
The testof jointdominance to be appliedhas nowbeen confirmedby theCourtof First Instance in the
recent CaseT-342/99 Airtoursplcv Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.The three-part testrequires that:
(a) Eachmember of the dominant oligopolymust have the ability to know how the othermembers
are behaving in order tomonitor whether or not they are adopting the common policy. It is not
enough for each member of the dominant oligopoly to be aware that interdependent market
conduct is profitable for all of them but each member must also have a means of knowing
whether the other operators are adopting the same strategy andwhether they aremaintaining
it. There must, therefore, be sufficient market transparency for all members of the dominant
oligopoly to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of theway inwhich the other members'
market conduct is evolving.
(b) The situation of tacit co-ordination must be sustainable over time, that is to say, theremust be
an incentive not to depart from the common policy on themarket.
(c) To prove the existence of a collective dominant position to the requisite legal standard, it must
be established that the foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of
consumers, would not jeopardise the results expected from the common policy.
In the present case, the court held that it was not necessary for the defendants to know precisely
what the costbasewas, or for them tobe engagedin a systemof jointdecision-making. Itwas enough
that there was `tacit co-ordination' in their conduct. Economic links need to be shown. It is not
enough simply to look to the market structure in ascertaining whether there is joint dominance;
reference should also be had to the special relationship (contractual or otherwise) between the
parties. In the case ofmembers of a single liner conference, that economic link is readily seen (French
West-African Shipowners' Committees, OJ [1992] L134/1). In the present case which involves two
defendants belonging to two liner conferences, itmust be said that the economic link is a littlemore
opaque. However, the court, in reliance on the test in Airtours, found that as the two conferences
tended to mirror each other in the setting of prices and the changing of prices, itmust be concluded
that therewas jointdominance.The interdependencebetween the defendants and the fact that there
was a common policy whichwas known to themprovided the requisite economic link.
As to the issue of abuse of dominance, the court considered that although the rates charged by the
defendantswerebelow the averagevariable cost, existing case lawdoes not suggest that the need to
ascertain whether there was eliminatory intent could be dispensed with (see Case C-62/86 AKZO
Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359). Nonetheless, the court was careful to state that the
methodology used to calculate the average variable cost was not satisfactory. On the issue of
intention to exclude or eliminate competition, it may be recalled that in the CMB case, the ECJ had
held that where a liner conference in a dominant position selectively cuts its prices in order deliber-
ately to match those of a competitor, the presumption is that it will derive a dual benefit ^ the elim-
ination of the principal competitor and continuing to require its users to pay higher prices for the
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serviceswhich are not threatenedby that competition.The questionwas whether that presumption
applies in the present case.
The court considered that although therewas some evidence of the predatory pricing, the intention
was to win back customers and not to eliminate or exclude competition. It found that the market
conditions in CMB were different in that the liner conference in that case controlled 90 per cent of
themarket share and therewas onlyone other competitor. In thepresentcase, themarket sharewas
smaller and there was another player (MSC) in the market. It was also apparent that BCL had itself
taken very aggressive pricing measures against MSC and the defendants. The court was to some
extent swayed by the defendants' contention that they needed to defend themselves. This is an
interesting way of applying the presumption in CMB: the dual benefit presumption only applies
where, in the words of Colman J, the claimant is a competitor with `very fragile strength'.This con-
firms, to some extent, theview that abuse is integrally linked to the extentof the dominance (see for
example, Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951) and perhaps,
more controversially, the fragility of the competitor in question.The latter consideration is, to some
extent, controversial because there is some suggestion that the concept of abuse of dominance is an
objective issue (see for example Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v
Commission [1973] ECR 215; Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG [1998] ECR I-7791): the abuse is to be assessed from a market
perspective not from the perspective of a specific claimant. Indeed, in a case of enforcement by the
Commission, for example, theremay not be a specific individual `victim'.
There is no denying thatmuch in the present case had depended on the cogency of evidence, both of
the anti-competitive activities alleged and the economics of the pricing regimes. At the end of the
day, the court was not convinced that therewas abuse because BCL, the claimant, was not as weak
and susceptible to bullying as they were hoping tomake out.There are a few important clarifications
of the law though: first, the notion of liner conferences; secondly, the burden of proof as regards the
block exemption; thirdly, the issue of joint dominance; and finally, the subjective eliminatory intent
required.
JC
HAGUE-VISBY RULES ^ TIME LIMIT ^ INCORPORATED INTO VOYAGE CHARTER ^
COMMENCEMENT ^ DELIVERY OF GOODS
Trafigura Beheer v Golden Stavraetos Maritime Inc
[2003] EWCACiv 664; [2003] All ER192 (May) English Court of Appeal
Facts
By a charterparty in BEEPEETIME form dated 16 December 1999 with amendments and additional
clauses, the defendant ( t`he owners') chartered the Sonia to the claimant (`the charterers') for a
voyage from1/2 safe ports in Saudi Arabia to1/2 safe ports in various places. Article III Rule 6 of the
Hague-Visby Ruleswas incorporated.The part of Article III Rule 6 ( t`he one-year time bar provision')
relevant to the dispute states as follows:
. . . the carrier and the ship shall in anyeventbe discharged from all liability whatsoever in respectof the
goods, unless suit is broughtwithin oneyear of their deliveryor of the datewhen they shouldhavebeen
delivered.
In the event, the vessel was to load a cargo of Jet A-1 fuel for carriage from Rabigh, Saudi Arabia for
delivery to Lagos1 ( t`he first voyage').
1 The charterers had originally nominated Mombasa as the discharge port, but subsequently nominated Lagos.No issue was raised in
relation to this.
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